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Trending Today Supreme Court Strikes Down Electoral Bond Scheme as Unconstitutional for Undermining Transparency and Democratic Principles on dated 15th February, 2024. Historic Verdict: Supreme Court Overturns 1998 Ruling P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE), Ends Immunity for Lawmakers Taking Bribes for Votes on 4th March, 2024 Supreme Court Overrules Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd The State or its instrumentality cannot tinker with the “rules of the game” insofar as the prescription of eligibility criteria Validity of LMV Driving License for Transport Vehicles Minority Status of educational institutions not affected by statute, date of establishment, or non-minority administration JAMMU AND KASHMIR POST ARTICLE 370 ANIMAL CRUELTY CONTROVERSY: HOW THE 2023 SCC DECISION AFFECT JALIKATTU Role of technology in transforming the Indian judiciary COMMON CAUSE v. UNION OF INDIA 2018 Historic Verdict: Supreme Court Overturns 1998 Ruling P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE), Ends Immunity for Lawmakers Taking Bribes for Votes on 4th March, 2024 06 Mar 2025 [post-views] Table of contents Background P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE), (1998) SC Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2014 SC Reference to 7-Judge Bench 7-Judge Bench Decision Parliamentary Privilege in India Whether Parliamentary privileges attract immunity to a member of Parliament or of the Legislatures who engages in bribery in connection with their speech or vote? At which stage does the offence of Bribery crystallizes? Criminal Appeal No. 451 of 2019 Sita Soren                                           …Appellant Versus Union of India                                       …Respondent Date of judgement:- 4th march, 2024 Presiding judge: DY Chandrachud, CJI, AS Bopanna, MM Sundresh, Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, JB Pardiwala, Sanjay Kumar and Manoj Misra, JJ.  The 7-Judge Constitution Bench  overturned the 5-Judge Bench 1998 verdict in P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE), (1998) 4 SCC 626, wherein it was established that the Member of Parliaments (‘MP’) and Member of Legislative Assemblies (‘MLA’) enjoyed immunity if they cast vote in the House after taking bribe for it. Background Article 105(2) and 194(2) of the Constitution Article 105(2) of the Constitution of India grants immunity to MPs against prosecution in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament or any committee. Article 194(2) of the Constitution grants similar immunity to MLAs. P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE), (1998) SC The majority of 5-Judge Constitution Bench held that the MPs who allegedly accepted bribe and voted against the no-confidence motion were entitled to immunity under Article 105(2) of Constitution. It said that “no member (of Parliament) is answerable in a court of law or any similar tribunal for what he has said in Parliament. This again is recognition of the fact that a member needs the freedom to say what he thinks is right in Parliament undeterred by the fear of being proceeded against. A vote, whether cast by voice or gesture or the aid of a machine, is treated as an extension of speech or a substitute for speech and is given the protection that the spoken word has.” Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2014 SC This case revolved around complaints of Horse-Trading during election of the Council of the States, and facts reflected that after receiving money, the said member did caste vote, but not in favour of the bribe giver. The Court relied on the majority view in P.V. Narasimha Rao (supra) to express that the act of receiving money had no nexus with the alleged conspiracy or the act of casting vote. The Court viewed that the petitioner’s act of receiving money pursuant to the conspiracy and agreement with bribe giver lacked nexus with the vote due to the fact that she did not cast vote in favour of the said person and will have no immunity as guaranteed under Article 194(2) of the Constitution. Reference to 7-Judge Bench While hearing an appeal against the High Court’s decision, the three-judge Bench of the Court said that the question that whether by virtue of Article 105(2) and 194(2) of the Constitution the MPs or MLAs can claim immunity from the prosecution on a criminal charge of bribery, was dealt by a 5-Judge Bench in P.V. Narasimha Rao (supra), hence, considering the wide ramification of the question, the doubts raised and the issue being a matter of public importance, the correctness of the P.V. Narasimha Rao was referred to a larger bench. 7-Judge Bench Decision Reconsidering PV Narasimha Rao does not violate the principle of stare decisis Referring to Maganlal Chhaganlal (P) Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of Greater Bombay, (1974) 2 SCC 402 the Court said that the ability of the Court to reconsider its decisions is necessary for the organic development of law and the advancement of justice. Further, the Court said that if the Court is denuded of its power to reconsider its decisions, the development of constitutional jurisprudence would virtually come to a standstill. The Court also reiterated that the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule of law, and it cannot result in perpetuating an error to the detriment of the general welfare of the public. The Court explained that its earlier decisions can be reviewed by the Court, if it believes that there is an error, or the effect of the decision would harm the interests of the public or if “it is inconsistent with the legal philosophy of the Constitution”. The Court stated that “the period of time over which the case has held the field is not of primary consequence”. Hence, the Court said that the majority judgment in PV Narasimha Rao (supra) deals with an important question of constitutional interpretation which has wide ramifications on public interest, probity in public life and the functioning of parliamentary democracy and as it contains several apparent errors inter alia in its interpretation of the text of Article 105; its conceptualization of the scope and purpose of parliamentary privilege and its approach to international jurisprudence all of which have resulted in a paradoxical outcome. Parliamentary Privilege in India The Court said that the clause (1) and (2) of the Article 105 of

Trending Today Supreme Court Overrules Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd The State or its instrumentality cannot tinker with the “rules of the game” insofar as the prescription of eligibility criteria Validity of LMV Driving License for Transport Vehicles Minority Status of educational institutions not affected by statute, date of establishment, or non-minority administration JAMMU AND KASHMIR POST ARTICLE 370 ANIMAL CRUELTY CONTROVERSY: HOW THE 2023 SCC DECISION AFFECT JALIKATTU Role of technology in transforming the Indian judiciary COMMON CAUSE v. UNION OF INDIA 2018 Legal Framework governing reproductive rights and abortion law The Impact of Contract Law on E-Commerce and Online Transactions Supreme Court Overrules Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. Verdict: States Can Tax Industrial Alcohol – Supreme Court decided on 23 october, 2024 05 Mar 2025 Table of contents Introduction Constitutional Framework, Statutory Provisions, and the Synthetics Judgment Court’s Assessment Reconciling Entry 8 of List II and Entry 52 of List I Understanding Entry 52 of List I and its Limitations Whether Entry 52 of List I Override Entry 8 of List II? Defining ‘Intoxicating Liquor’  Civil Appeal No 151 of 2007 State of U.P. & Ors.                                        …Appellants Versus  M/S Lalta Prasad Vaish and sons                             …Respondent Date of Judgement:-  23 october, 2024 Presiding judges:- Dr DY Chandrachud, CJ.* Hrishikesh Roy, J Abhay S. Oka, J JB Pardiwala, J Manoj Misra, J Ujjal Bhuyan, J Satish Chandra Sharma B V Nagarathna, J and Augustine George Masih, JJ. INTRODUCTION:- In an appeal concerning the scope of State Legislatures’ power under Entry 8 and the interpretation of “intoxicating liquor”—whether it includes only potable alcohol or also extends to alcohol used in other industries—a 9-Judge Constitution Bench ruled by an 8:1 majority as follows: Entry 8 of List II in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution serves as both an industry-based and product-based entry. The phrase “that is to say” does not limit its scope, covering everything from raw materials to the consumption of intoxicating liquor. Parliament cannot claim complete control over the industry through a declaration under Entry 52 of List I. The State Legislature’s power under Entry 24 of List II is only restricted to the extent that Parliament legislates under Entry 52 of List I. Parliament lacks the legislative competence to take control of the intoxicating liquor industry covered under Entry 8 of List II using its authority under Article 246 and Entry 52 of List I. Entry 8 of List II is grounded in public interest and extends beyond potable alcohol. The term “intoxicating” suggests that it includes alcohol with potential misuse affecting public health. This encompasses substances like rectified spirit, ENA, and denatured spirit, which serve as raw materials for alcoholic beverages and other products. However, it does not cover final products containing alcohol, such as hand sanitizers, as that would encroach upon other legislative domains. The majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice Dr. DY Chandrachud along with Justices Hrishikesh Roy, Abhay S. Oka, JB Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, Ujjal Bhuyan, Satish Chandra Sharma, and Augustine George Masih, also overruled the 7-Judge Bench decision in Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1990) 1 SCC 109, which had held that States could not impose taxes on industrial alcohol. Justice  V. Nagarathna was the sole dissenter in the case. Background: Constitutional Framework, Statutory Provisions, and the Synthetics Judgment:- The present appeal centered on the legislative authority of State Legislatures under Entry 8 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution, specifically concerning the regulation and taxation of industrial alcohol. As per the Constitutional framework, States have legislative competence over ‘industries’ under Entry 24 of List II. However, this power is subject to Entries 7 and 52 of List I. Entry 8 of List II pertains to ‘intoxicating liquors,’ followed by the phrase “that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase, and sale of intoxicating liquors.” Additionally, the Seventh Schedule distinctly allocates taxing powers related to alcohol. Under Article 246, in conjunction with Entry 52 of List I, Parliament enacted the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (IDRA). Section 2 of IDRA grants the Union control over “Fermentation Industries,” including alcohol production. A 2016 amendment to Item 26 of the First Schedule of IDRA specifically excluded potable alcohol from its ambit. Furthermore, Section 18-G of IDRA empowers the Central Government to regulate the supply and distribution of goods related to a scheduled industry to ensure equitable distribution and fair pricing. In Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. v. State of U.P., a 7-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court examined two key issues: The validity of vend fees imposed on industrial alcohol under various State laws, and Whether the power to levy excise duty on industrial alcohol rested with the State or the Centre. The Court held that the term “intoxicating liquor” in Entry 8 refers exclusively to liquor that is consumable in its existing form by humans. It further established three key principles: States lack the authority to impose taxes on industrial alcohol. States can impose taxes on potable alcohol. States can levy fees on industrial alcohol. In State of U.P. v. Lalta Prasad, (2007) 13 SCC 463, the Supreme Court identified six issues requiring adjudication by a larger Bench. Subsequently, in December 2010, a 5-Judge Bench observed that the ruling in Synthetics warranted reconsideration by a 9-Judge Bench and directed the matter accordingly. Court’s Assessment: In its preliminary observations, the Court delved into the distinction between potable and non-potable alcohol. It was noted that the complexity, where the materials for the preparation of potable alcohol are also used for the preparation of other products, a simplistic classification of ‘potable’ and ‘non-potable’ alcohol cannot be made for the purposes of this judgment. Reconciling Entry 8 of List II and Entry 52 of List I Entry 8 of List II specifically deals with ‘intoxicating liquor,’ defining its scope through the phrase “that is to say,” which serves to clarify its coverage rather than restrict it. This entry includes all aspects of intoxicating liquor, from production to sale, as indicated by the terms “production,