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Validity of LMV Driving License for Transport Vehicles

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Trending Today The State or its instrumentality cannot tinker with the “rules of the game” insofar as the prescription of eligibility criteria Validity of LMV Driving License for Transport Vehicles Minority Status of educational institutions not affected by statute, date of establishment, or non-minority administration JAMMU AND KASHMIR POST ARTICLE 370 ANIMAL CRUELTY CONTROVERSY: HOW THE 2023 SCC DECISION AFFECT JALIKATTU Role of technology in transforming the Indian judiciary COMMON CAUSE v. UNION OF INDIA 2018 Legal Framework governing reproductive rights and abortion law The Impact of Contract Law on E-Commerce and Online Transactions Indian Parliament Validity of LMV Driving License for Transport Vehicles: Supreme Court on 6th November, 2024 04 Mar 2025 CIVIL APPEAL No. 841 of 2018 M/s BAJAJ ALLIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.                           …APPELLANT(S) VERSUS RAMBHA DEVI & ORS.                           …RESPONDENT(S) Date of the Judgement- 6th November, 2024 Presideng Judges: DY Chandrachud, CJI, Hrishikesh Roy, PS Narasimha, Pankaj Mithal, and Manoj Misra, JJ Introduction In a case addressing whether an individual with a driving license for a ‘Light Motor Vehicle’ (LMV) is permitted to drive a ‘transport vehicle’ within the LMV category with an unladen weight not exceeding 7500 kg, a five-judge bench ruled that a person holding an LMV license can operate such a transport vehicle without requiring a specific endorsement. The issue at hand originated in the case of Mukund Dewangan v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited (2017) 14 SCC 663, where a 3-judge bench ruled that no separate endorsement was needed on an LMV driving license to operate a transport vehicle with an unladen weight below 7500 kg. The Court held that a person with an LMV license could drive a “transport vehicle of light motor vehicle class” weighing up to 7500 kg. However, in 2022, a coordinate bench raised doubts about this ruling, and the matter was subsequently referred to a larger 5-judge bench for further consideration. Adopting a harmonious interpretation of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (‘MV Act’), the Court upheld the decision in Mukund Dewangan (supra). Decisions:- The Court gave the following conclusions: A driver holding a license for LMV for vehicles underweight 7500 kg is permitted to operate a transport vehicle without needing additional authorisation under Section 10(2)(e) of the MV Act. For licensing purposes, LMVs and transport vehicles are not completely distinct categories, as there is some overlap between the two. A driver holding an LMV license can, under certain conditions, operate light commercial transport vehicles. However, there are still specific eligibility requirements that apply to certain types of vehicles, such as e-carts, e-rickshaws, and vehicles transporting hazardous goods. The second part of Section 3(1), which emphasises the necessity of a specific requirement to drive transport vehicle, does not supersede the definition of LMV provided in Section 2(21) of the MV Act. The additional eligibility criteria specified in the MV Act and MV Rules generally for driving transport vehicles would apply only to those intending to operate transport vehicles exceeding 7500 kgs, i.e medium goods vehicle, medium passenger vehicle, heavy goods vehicle and heavy passenger vehicles. … 2 Comments ANIMAL CRUELTY CONTROVERSY: HOW THE 2023 SCC DECISION AFFECT JALIKATTU – sadalawpublications.comFebruary 27, 2025 at 8:17 am | Edit[…] rights and abortion law The Impact of Contract Law on E-Commerce and Online Transactions Indian Parliament Addressing Judicial Issues in Revenge Porn Cases Triviality section 95 INDIAN YOUNG […]Reply RAVI KUMARFebruary 8, 2025 at 2:48 am | EditThe freedom we enjoy today is ours due to the lifelong struggle of our ancestors who fought tooth and nail for it. People from different backgrounds joined the show, inspired by the ideology of freedom, equality and democracy. Its a very good xplanation. #goodarticleReply Leave a Reply Cancel Reply Logged in as sadalawpublications@gmail.com. Edit your profile. Log out? Required fields are marked * Message*

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Minority Status of educational institutions not affected by statute, date of establishment, or non-minority administration

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Trending Today Validity of LMV Driving License for Transport Vehicles Minority Status of educational institutions not affected by statute, date of establishment, or non-minority administration JAMMU AND KASHMIR POST ARTICLE 370 ANIMAL CRUELTY CONTROVERSY: HOW THE 2023 SCC DECISION AFFECT JALIKATTU Role of technology in transforming the Indian judiciary COMMON CAUSE v. UNION OF INDIA 2018 Legal Framework governing reproductive rights and abortion law The Impact of Contract Law on E-Commerce and Online Transactions Indian Parliament Addressing Judicial Issues in Revenge Porn Cases Minority Status of educational institutions not affected by statute, date of establishment, or non-minority administration :Supreme Court on 8th November, 2024 03 Mar 2025 Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal, 2024 Civil Appeal no. 2286 of 2006 Parties involved :  Aligarh Muslim University ……….. Appellant                                                             Vs.                                                               Naresh Agarwal & Ors“     ………..Respondents   Date of judgement: 8th november 2024 President Judges:- Dr. DY Chandrachud, CJ.,  Sanjiv Khanna, Surya Kant, JB Pardiwala, Dipankar Datta, Manoj Misra and Satish Chandra Sharma  Facts and judgement :- In an appeal against Allahabad High Court’s Order in Naresh Agarwal (Dr.) v. Union of India, 2005 whereby, Aligarh Muslim University’s (‘AMU’) action of 50 percent seat reservation in postgraduate medical courses for Muslim candidates by claiming it to be a minority institution, was struck down and held that AMU cannot have an exclusive reservation because it is not a minority institution, the Seven-Judge Constitution Bench comprising of Dr. DY Chandrachud, CJ., Sanjiv Khanna, Surya Kant, JB Pardiwala, Dipankar Datta, Manoj Misra and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ. in 4: 3 overruled the Five-Judge Bench verdict in S. Azeez Basha v. Union of India, 1967,  which held that an institution incorporated by a statute cannot claim to be a minority institution, hence AMU as created by an Act of Parliament, is not a minority institution so as to be covered under Article 30 of the Constitution of India.   Issues: Whether an educational institution must be both established and administered by a linguistic or religious minority to secure the guarantee under Article 30? What are the criteria to be satisfied for the ‘establishment’ of a minority institution? Whether Article 30(1) envisages an institution which is established by a minority with participation from members of other communities; Whether a minority educational institution which is registered as a society under the Societies Registration Act 1860 soon after its establishment loses its status as a minority educational institution by virtue of such registration; and Whether the decision of this Court in Prof. Yashpal v. State of Chhattisgarh (2005) 5 SCC 420 and the amendment of National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions Act 2005 in 2010 have a bearing on the question formulated above and if so, in what manner…. Brief Undertanding about Amu through the time line in this case 1877- Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Founded the Muhammadan Anglo- orientation college (MAO Colle) at aligarh The britishers imperial legislative council enacted the aligarh muslim university Act (AMU Act) incorporating AMU as a university Indian independence Indian constitution Article 30 A constitution bench (5 judge) in which held that an institution incorporated by a statute cannot claim to be a minority institution, hence AMU as created by an Act of Parliament, is not a minority institution so as to be covered under Article 30 of the Constitution of India. Parliament enacted the aligarh muslim University (Amendment) Act, 1981. This Amendment chenged the AMU Act and changed the definition of the word “University” as an institution “established by the muslims of India, etc. Note: the parliament tried to rectify the mistakes becoz of which AMU lost the minority university status. The AMU reserved 50% seats in postgraduate medical courses for muslim andidates by claaming it to be a minority institution. This bill was challedged in Dr. Naresh Agarwal v Union of India . The Allahabad High Court struch down the reservation policy and held that the AMU couldnot have an exclusive reservation because it was not a minority institution acoording to S. Azeez Basha. A three judges bench heard the AMU’S appeal and referred the decision in S. Azeez Basha for reconsideration by a seven – judge bench. Decision- The Suprme court by a 4:3 majority overruled Azeezz Basha. The majority held that merely because an institution is created by a statute does not strip it of minority status. The majority also held that Article 30(1) protectes institutes established before the constitution came into force in 1950. The court laid criteria to determine when an institution is a minority institution benefitting from Article  30(1) protection. The Court further laid down the factors which must be used to determine if a minority ‘established’ an educational institution: The indicia of ideation, purpose and implementation must be satisfied. First, the idea for establishing an educational institution must have stemmed from a person or group belonging to the minority community; second, the educational institution must be established predominantly for the benefit of the minority community; and third, steps for the implementation of the idea must have been taken by the member(s) of the minority community; and The administrative set up of the educational institution must elucidate and affirm (I) the minority character of the educational institution; and (II) that it was established to protect and promote the interests of the minority community. The Court overruled the view taken in Azeez Basha (supra) that an educational institution is not established by a minority if it derives its legal character through a statute. 4 Comments ANIMAL CRUELTY CONTROVERSY: HOW THE 2023 SCC DECISION AFFECT JALIKATTU – sadalawpublications.comFebruary 27, 2025 at 8:19 am | Edit […] law The Impact of Contract Law on E-Commerce and Online Transactions Indian Parliament Addressing Judicial Issues in Revenge Porn Cases Triviality section 95 INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION v.

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ANIMAL CRUELTY CONTROVERSY: HOW THE 2023 SCC DECISION AFFECT JALIKATTU

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Trending Today ANIMAL CRUELTY CONTROVERSY: HOW THE 2023 SCC DECISION AFFECT JALIKATTU Role of technology in transforming the Indian judiciary COMMON CAUSE v. UNION OF INDIA 2018 Legal Framework governing reproductive rights and abortion law The Impact of Contract Law on E-Commerce and Online Transactions Indian Parliament Addressing Judicial Issues in Revenge Porn Cases Triviality section 95 INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE OF KERALA & Ors Legal Framework governing reproductive rights and abortion law ANIMAL CRUELTY CONTROVERSY: HOW THE 2023 SCC DECISION AFFECT JALIKATTU 27 Feb 2025 Introduction Violent acts against animals and traditional customs have long been at odds with each other, particularly in countries like India, where cultural legacy and modern ethics sometimes conflict. One of the most heated controversies in recent years has centred on Jallikattu, an ancestral bull-taming sport popular in Tamil Nadu. The 2023 case of Animal Welfare Board of India vs. Union of India (2023 SCC Online SC 661) demonstrates the continuous legal and ethical conflict between animal rights activists and cultural supporters. This case provides an important prism through which to evaluate the bigger problems of animal welfare, cultural rights, and legal interpretations in contemporary India. Overview on Jallikattu Jallikattu is an old sport that has been played for almost 2,000 years and is traditionally celebrated during Tamil Nadu’s Pongal festival, which celebrates the harvest. Contestants attempt to catch a bull by the hump and ride it as long as possible, or to bring it to a halt. Proponents claim that Jallikattu is more than a sport; it is a symbol of Tamil culture and identity. They argue it serves an important role in protecting indigenous cattle breeds, strengthening community relationships, and honouring courage. Nevertheless, animal rights organisations, like the Animal Welfare Board of India (AWBI), claim that Jallikattu subjected bulls to severe brutality and stress. There have been reports of bulls being force-fed alcohol, having their tails twisted or bitten, and being physically assaulted in order to induce violence. These behaviours raise serious questions regarding animal care and the ethical implications of carrying on such a tradition in contemporary society. Judicial Trail Heading to 2023 The legal battle over Jallikattu has been going on for more than a decade. In 2014, the Supreme Court of India prohibited Jallikattu, alleging animal cruelty and protecting animal rights under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act of 1960. The moratorium was a big success for animal rights campaigners, but it sparked widespread demonstrations in Tamil Nadu, where Jallikattu is regarded as an important part of cultural legacy. In the wake of popular outrage, the Tamil Nadu government issued a resolution in 2017 that permitted Jallikattu, which was eventually adopted by Parliament. The ordinance was challenged in the Supreme Court, sparking a complicated legal process that resulted in the 2023 decision. The 2023 Supreme Court Judgement: Critical Arguments In the case of Animal Welfare Board of India vs. Union of India (2023 SCC Online SC 661), the court had to balance cultural rights with animal welfare. The case featured comments from both sides, illustrating the deep-seated tensions and complexities of the matter. Claims for Jallikattu Cultural Heritage and Identity: Proponents, including the Tamil Nadu government, contended that Jallikattu is a centuries-old ritual rooted in Tamil culture. They contended that prohibiting the sport would violate the Tamil people’s cultural rights, which are protected by Article 29 of the Indian Constitution. Socioeconomic and Humanitarian consequences: Supporters emphasised Jallikattu’s economic benefits, such as preserving indigenous cow breeds. They suggested that the sport encourages farmers to raise local bulls, so improving biodiversity and livelihoods in the countryside. Statutory Mechanisms: The Tamil Nadu government convinced the court that measures have been implemented to reduce animal cruelty. These included veterinarian checks, sport-specific laws and regulations, and penalties for violators. They argued that these procedures would safeguard the bulls’ care while allowing the custom to continue. Arguments Against Jallikattu. Animal Mistreatment: The AWBI along with different animal rights groups provided considerable proof of bull cruelty during Jallikattu. They contended that no amount of regulation could overcome the sport’s intrinsic brutality, in which the primary goal is to irritate and dominate the animal. Legal precedents and animal rights: They emphasised earlier Supreme Court rulings, including the 2014 decision that recognised animal rights under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act. They contended that permitting Jallikattu would undermine animal protection laws and set an undesirable precedent. Ethical dilemmas: Beyond legal considerations, animal rights campaigners invoked broader ethical concerns, suggesting that cultural practices must adapt to changing society norms. They argued that cruelty to animals cannot be justified in the sake of tradition. The Judgement and its repercussions The Supreme Court’s 2023 decision was a careful attempt to manage the delicate nexus of cultural rights and animal welfare. The court acknowledged Jallikattu’s traditional significance while emphasising the importance of ensuring the welfare of the animals involved. The decision permitted Jallikattu to continue, but only with strict controls intended at reducing cruelty and guaranteeing adherence to animal welfare standards. The primary provisions of the judgement Regulatory Oversight: The court mandated independent panels to oversee Jallikattu tournaments. These committees are responsible for ensuring that the regulations are rigorously observed and that any incidents of cruelty are swiftly addressed. Veterinary Care: The judgement emphasised the importance of complete veterinary care before, during, and after the occurrence. Bulls must be tested for fitness, and any bull judged to be unfit is not permitted to compete. Training and Recognition: The court directed the Tamil Nadu government to instruct organisers and participants on animal care norms. This involves educating them on the legal and ethical duties associated with running the sport. Repercussions: Violations of regulations may result in fines and imprisonment. The court warned that any violation from the stipulated norms would result in severe repercussions. larger consequences for animal welfare and cultural practices. The 2023 decision in Animal Welfare Board of India vs. Union of India is significant not only for Jallikattu, but also for the larger discussion of

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COMMON CAUSE v. UNION OF INDIA 2018

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Trending Today COMMON CAUSE v. UNION OF INDIA 2018 Legal Framework governing reproductive rights and abortion law The Impact of Contract Law on E-Commerce and Online Transactions Indian Parliament Addressing Judicial Issues in Revenge Porn Cases Triviality section 95 INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE OF KERALA & Ors Legal Framework governing reproductive rights and abortion law The Role of International Law in Shaping Domestic Constitutions Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and Cultural Heritage Preservation COMMON CAUSE v. UNION OF INDIA 2018 13 Feb 2025 CASE SUMMARY: In this landmark judgement the apex court in India recognised the right to die with dignity and held passive euthanasia to be legal in the country. Therefore, passive euthanasia was legalised only with strict regulations which allowed individuals to draft a “living will” to outline their end-of-life care preferences. THE CONCEPT OF EUTHANASIA: Euthanasia is a medical practice aimed at peacefully ending the life of a patient who has been in a vegetative state for an extended period. This compassionate action is taken to spare the patient from prolonged suffering and incapacity beyond recovery. In exceptional circumstances, with the patient’s consent expressed through a living will or by the agreement of their loved ones, medical practitioners and doctors may choose to administer euthanasia. Euthanasia is majorly active or passive. Active euthanasia means intentionally ending a patient’s life by taking direct action, typically by administering a lethal dose of medication. Passive euthanasia means letting the patient die by stopping life support, like ventilators or feeding tubes. In passive euthanasia, the patient’s life is not actively terminated but rather allowed to end naturally due to the withdrawal of life-sustaining measures. BACKGROUND AND FACTS OF THE CASE: India’s highest court in P. Rathinam v. Union of India[i] (1994) was served with a question that whether the right to die is a fundamental right under Article 21[ii], Section 309 IPC[iii] (which criminalises attempted suicide), was contested. Citing Maruti Shripati Dubal v. State of Maharashtra[iv] (1987), the Court ruled Section 309 unconstitutional, stating that fundamental rights include both positive and negative aspects, thereby suggesting that the right to life also includes the right to die. However, in Gian Kaur v. State of Punjab[v], P. Rathinam was overruled, the Court clarified that fundamental rights are unique and shouldn’t be interpreted in the same way. Thus, the right to life does not include the right to die, particularly because suicide requires a deliberate act by the person. The Court differentiated between the “right to die” and the “right to die with dignity,” acknowledging the natural dying process for terminally ill or vegetative state patients. In Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v. Union of India[vi] (2011), the Court addressed euthanasia for Aruna Shanbaug, who was in a persistent vegetative state after a severe assault. The Court ruled that passive euthanasia could be allowed under certain conditions, based on the patient’s consent or a close friend’s judgment, with approval from the High Court and a medical board’s examination. This ruling would stand until Parliament passed relevant legislation. In the 2018 case[vii], A writ petition was submitted asking the court to recognise that the ‘right to live with dignity’ under Article 21 also encompasses the ‘right to die with dignity.’ This would allow individuals in a vegetative state or those who are terminally ill to create a living will or Advance Medical Directive. The petition was first examined by a 3-judge Bench but was later referred to a Constitution Bench because of conflicting legal precedents regarding the right to die. ISSUES RAISED AND ARGUMENTS ADVANCED: The matters addressed in this case pertain to the distinction between active and passive euthanasia, the recognition of the right to die as a fundamental entitlement alongside the right to life under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, and whether individuals can stipulate passive euthanasia in their living wills under exceptional circumstances. Additionally, has the Law Commission of India provided any recommendations concerning the utilisation of euthanasia to mitigate patient distress? Furthermore, is there any provision affording individuals the authority to cease medical treatment or withdraw life-sustaining equipment, thereby leading to death? In this case the petitioner(s) contended that people should have the right to make their own life decisions, including end-of-life choices, based on their personal autonomy, which is linked to their right to privacy and freedom. They argued that using advanced medical treatments to extend the lives of patients in a vegetative state increased their suffering and violated their autonomy and dignity. They also emphasized that the rights to live and die with dignity are closely related.pointing to the common law principle that lets people refuse medical treatment they don’t want. On the other hand, the respondent, represented by the Ministry of Health and Family Affairs, argued against regulating euthanasia, saying it’s too specific to be governed by uniform laws. They claimed that Article 21 of the Indian Constitution guarantees the right to live with dignity, covering necessities like food and medical care, but does not include the right to die with dignity. JUDGEMENT OF THE CASE: In the Gian Kaur, the apex Court said that the right to a respectful death is protected by the Constitution, but they made it clear that this decision didn’t include passive euthanasia. A distinction was drawn between the active euthanasia, which involves an action to end life, and passive euthanasia, which entails removing life support to alleviate suffering. The Court said that the need for a law to make passive euthanasia legal, as decided in the Aruna Shanbaug case, was wrong. Regarding living wills, the Court recognised the adoption of advance medical directives in India, viewing it as a step to safeguard individual autonomy and self-determination. It explored the relationship between autonomy, liberty, and privacy, as established in the Justice K.S. Puttaswamy case[viii]. The Court said that privacy rights include decisions about death. They linked these rights to the fundamental rights to life and personal freedom in Article 21 of the Constitution. CONCLUSION: In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in India

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INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE OF KERALA & Ors

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INDIAN YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCIATION v. STATE OF KERALA & Ors 25 jan 2025 Historical Background The Sabarimala temple is one of the most prominent pilgrimage sites in India, located in the Periyar Tiger Reserve in the Western Ghat mountain ranges of Kerala. It is dedicated to the Hindu deity Ayyappan. The temple is estimated to be over 1000 years old. The Sabarimala temple attracts over 50 million devotees each year, making it one of the largest annual pilgrimages in the world. It is open to worshippers of all faiths and backgrounds. One of the longstanding traditions at Sabarimala was the restriction on the entry of women of menstruating age (generally defined as between 10 to 50 years old). This practice was justified on the grounds of preserving the temple’s sanctity and the belief that the presence of women of menstruating age would disrupt the ascetic practices of the male devotees. In 1990, S. Mahendran filed a plea challenging the ban on women’s entry into the temple, arguing that it violated principles of equality and non-discrimination. However, the Kerala High Court dismissed the plea, upholding the temple’s traditional practices. Subsequently, in 2006, another plea was filed by young Indian lawyers seeking to allow women’s entry into the Sabarimala temple. The case sparked significant debate and legal scrutiny regarding gender equality and religious practices. On 28th September 2018, the Supreme Court of India passed a landmark verdict in the case, overturning the centuries-old ban and allowing women of all ages to enter the Sabarimala temple. The Supreme Court’s decision was based on principles of gender equality and non-discrimination, emphasizing that religious practices cannot discriminate against women based on biological factors such as menstruation. The verdict led to widespread celebrations among activists advocating for gender equality and women’s rights, while it also sparked protests and resistance from certain religious groups and traditionalists who argued that the court’s decision interfered with religious customs and beliefs. In conclusion, the entry of women into the Sabarimala temple represents a significant milestone in India’s legal and social landscape, highlighting ongoing debates between religious freedom and individual rights, particularly concerning gender equality within religious traditions. Introduction The case of Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala & Ors marks a significant legal battle that unfolded in India, revolving around the issue of women’s entry into the Sabarimala temple in Kerala. Traditionally, the temple had barred women of menstruating age (between 10 to 50 years) from entering its premises, citing religious customs and the need to preserve the temple’s sanctity and ascetic traditions. Initiated by the Indian Young Lawyers Association in 2006, the case challenged this age-old practice, asserting that it infringed upon fundamental rights guaranteed by the Indian Constitution, particularly the rights to equality and non-discrimination. The legal challenge sparked intense debates across the country, drawing passionate arguments from supporters advocating for gender equality and opponents defending religious traditions. After a series of judicial proceedings and deliberations, the Supreme Court of India delivered a landmark verdict on 28th September 2018. The court’s decision overturned the ban on women’s entry into Sabarimala temple, affirming their right to worship without discrimination based on biological factors such as menstruation. The verdict was hailed as a significant step towards gender justice and equality under the law, while also prompting varied reactions and further debates on the balance between religious practices and constitutional rights in India. The case remains pivotal in India’s legal discourse, illustrating the judiciary’s role in interpreting and safeguarding fundamental rights amid cultural and religious diversity. Issues addressed: Whether the prohibition on women’s entry into Sabarimala violated their fundamental rights to equality under Articles 14, 15, and 17, as well as freedom of religion under Article 25 of the Constitution. Whether freedom of religion under Article 25 can allow restrictions based on biological factors exclusive to women, such as menstruation. Whether the Sabarimala temple qualifies as a denominational temple with autonomy over its religious practices under Article 26. Case facts: The Sabarimala case revolves around the longstanding practice of barring women of menstruating age (generally 10-50 years old) from entering the Sabarimala temple in Kerala. This custom was rooted in the belief that the presence of women of reproductive age could disrupt the celibate and ascetic environment of the temple, which is dedicated to Lord Ayyappa. The legal challenge began in 1990 when S. Mahendran filed a petition in the Kerala High Court seeking to lift the ban on women’s entry, arguing that it violated their fundamental rights of equality and non-discrimination under the Indian Constitution. Despite efforts, the Kerala High Court upheld the temple’s tradition, citing religious practices and beliefs. In 2006, the Indian Young Lawyers Association renewed the legal battle by filing a petition in the Supreme Court of India, challenging the exclusion of women from Sabarimala temple. The case gained national attention and sparked intense debates across various segments of society regarding gender equality, religious freedoms, and cultural traditions. After extensive hearings and deliberations, on 28th September 2018, the Supreme Court of India delivered a landmark verdict. The court ruled that the practice of prohibiting women of menstruating age from entering Sabarimala temple was unconstitutional and discriminatory. The judgment emphasized that religious beliefs and customs cannot override fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, particularly the rights to equality and freedom of worship. The Supreme Court’s decision was hailed as a significant step towards gender justice and equality in India. It marked a pivotal moment in the country’s legal history, highlighting the judiciary’s role in interpreting and safeguarding constitutional rights amid diverse religious practices and societal norms. While the verdict was celebrated by proponents of gender equality and women’s rights, it also prompted protests and resistance from traditionalists and religious groups who viewed the ruling as interference in religious traditions. The Sabarimala case continues to resonate in legal and social discussions, underscoring the complexities of balancing religious freedoms with constitutional guarantees of equality and non-discrimination. The bench of judges who delivered the judgment comprised: Chief Justice

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SPORTA TECHNOILOGIES V. HONG Y1 F35

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SPORTA TECHNOILOGIES V. HONG Y1 F35 20 jan 2025 NAME OF THE CASE: SPORTA TECHNOILOGIES V. HONG Y1 F35 CITATION: CS(COMM) 663/2023 & I.A. 18534/2023 NAME OF THE PLAINTIFF(S): SPORTA TECHNOLOGIES NAME OF THE DEFENDANT(S): JOHN DOE DATE OF THE JUDGMENT: 16TH OCTOBER, 2024 COURT: HIGH COURT OF DELHI NAME OF THE JUDGE: PRATIBHA M. SINGH FACTS: In a lawsuit, plaintiff Sporta Technologies Pvt Ltd. requested a permanent injunction to stop the defendants from engaging in their illegal activities, namely the operation of a website that closely resembles the plaintiffs’ well-known fantasy sports platform, “DREAM11.” Amit Bansal (defendant 1) with his representatives was restrained from the use of trademark ‘DREAM 11’, logos, trade name, domain name or part of email address, as it amounted to infringement of the plaintiffs’ trademarks and passing off the defendant’s services as those of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are well-established entities in the fantasy sports domain incorporated in India in 2007, and Dream Sports Inc., (Plaintiff 2) incorporated in Delaware, USA, serving as the holding company. DREAM 11 allowed user to create teams and play and gained significant popularity with the passage of time. In 2019, the plaintiffs entered an Indian Premier League (IPL) central sponsorship deal with the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI), which improved their standing and goodwill in the marketplace. On the other hand, Defendant 1 operates the website www.dream11com.in which allegedly replicates the earlier version of plaintiff’s website. The defendant’s site is claimed to provide identical fantasy sports services while also redirecting users to an external betting site, Gugobet, promoting activities that are illegal in India. ISSUES RAISED: The goal of the current lawsuit is to obtain a permanent injunction that will prevent the defendants from violating the plaintiffs’ copyright and trademark, passing off their products and services as the plaintiffs’, and other related reliefs. Whether the defendant infringe on plaintiff’s trademark by the use of identical or similar marks on their website? Whether the defendants violate the copyright of plaintiff by making a replica of Dream 11’s website interface? Whether the defendants’ actions amount to passing off by misrepresenting their services? Whether the plaintiff’s suit is eligible for summary judgement under Order VIII Rule 10 of CPC,1908? CONTENTION: PLAINTIFF SIDE: They argued that the defendants’ use and adoption of the mark “Dream11” in their business dealings was an obvious intent to profit from the plaintiff’s goodwill and, as such, constituted infringement. Plaintiff no.1-Sporta Technologies Pvt. Ltd. is a company incorporated in 2007 under the laws of India. Plaintiff no. Dream Sports Inc. is incorporated under the laws of Delaware, USA, and is the holding company of the plaintiff no.1. The ‘DREAM11′ fantasy sports platform, which was introduced in 2012 and lets users create virtual teams based on real players’ performance in real games, is owned and run by the plaintiffs. Additionally, plaintiff no.2 is the registrant of the domain ‘dream11.com’, which has been registered since 17th March 2008. The plaintiffs host an active website from the said domain, wherein it provides information about its Dream11 platform. Defendant No. 1 deceives the public by claiming to provide fantasy sports services that are exact replicas of those offered by the plaintiffs. The Plaint’s paragraph 25 goes into detail about the parallels. 11. The hyperlinks in the “How to Play on Dream11 App” FAQ section and the “Register Account” link on the contested website take users Digitally Signed By: DHARMENDER to www.gugobet.com, which actively encourages betting and gambling activities. Interestingly, the website in question states that it is “one of the biggest global sports betting websites, founded in the UK since 2006” in its “Gugobet Sponsor” section. Defendant No. 1 is damaging the plaintiffs’ brand and goodwill by directing users of the Dream11 platform to a website that provides unlawful betting and gaming services in India through the creation of a mirror website. The domain name registrar that registered the domain “dream11com.in” for defendant no. 1 is GoDaddy.com, LLC, the second defendant. The Department of Telecommunications and the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, respectively, are defendants number three and four. They were urged to request interim banning orders against the www.dream11com.in website. The National Internet Exchange of India is the fifth defendant. DEFENDANT SIDE: A conscious effort to deceive the public was demonstrated by the defendants’ refusal to reply to the lawsuit and their ongoing use of the plaintiffs’ intellectual property. JUDGEMENT: The Court referring to the principles established in previous rulings, highlighted in uncontested suits that it is permissible to base decisions on the plaint’s contents without necessitating further evidence. The court found that the plaintiff demonstrated their registered rights in their trademarks and copyright over the user interface of their website. The court thereby conducted thorough research and compared the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s websites, observing that the latter’s site utilized virtually identical elements, including the trademark and the tagline “DREAM BIG.” Here are the proceedings in the suit. On 22nd September 2023, An ex-parte ad-interim injunction was issued by this court against defendant number 1. It was ordered that defendant number two lock and suspend the domain “dream11com.in.” and provide details of the Registrant of the said domain, which were subsequently disclosed. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an amended Memo of Parties on 16th November 2023, substituting Hong Yi u5f35 as the defendant no. 1. On 17th November 2023, the learned Joint Registrar noted that the defendants no.2 to 4 were duly served. Nevertheless, the maximum allowable term of 120 days passed and no written statement was submitted on behalf of the aforementioned defendants. Despite being served on February 9, 2024, defendant number one did not provide a written statement within the allotted 120 days. As a result, on August 12, 2024, all defendants lost their ability to submit written statements. 16. The plaintiffs are now asking for a decree in line with Order VIII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). Mr. Seth, the plaintiffs’ lawyer, backed up his claim with the court’s decision in Satya

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