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Mala Etc. Etc. vs. State of Punjab & Others – Enhancement of Compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894

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Trending Today Mala Etc. Etc. vs. State of Punjab & Others – Enhancement of Compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 The Supreme Court Upholds Limited Judicial Review under the Arbitration Act of 1940 and Restores the Arbitral Award in a Contractor Dispute Criminal Appeal Challenging a Conviction for Murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code M. SIVADASAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS v. A. SOUDAMINI (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS. (2023) Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana & Others Niranjan Das @ Niru Das @ Mahanto vs The State of West Bengal Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) vs Superintendent of Central Excise and Others Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking (August 17, 2023) Assistant Wild Life Warden & Anr. v. K. K. Moideen & Anr. (August 09, 2023) M/S Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India & Ors. Mala Etc. Etc. vs. State of Punjab & Others – Enhancement of Compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 Reha Bhargav 17 October, 2025 Introduction: The case Mala Etc. Etc. vs. State of Punjab & Others (decided on August 17, 2023) revolves around the issue of fair compensation for land acquisition by the State of Punjab under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The appellants, whose agricultural land was taken for a public purpose, contested the compensation fixed by the Land Acquisition Collector, arguing it was below the market value. The Supreme Court examined whether further enhancement was justified beyond the High Court’s decision, which had already increased the compensation and granted statutory benefits. Background: The State of Punjab acquired agricultural land belonging to the appellants. The Land Acquisition Collector initially awarded low compensation. Dissatisfied, the landowners approached the Reference Court, which made a slight enhancement. The High Court then increased the compensation to ₹2,000 per marla and included statutory benefits under Sections 23(1A), 23(2), and 28 of the Act. The appellants, still unsatisfied, appealed to the Supreme Court, seeking a higher valuation. Key Developments: The appellants claimed the High Court failed to consider comparable sale deeds indicating higher market rates. The respondents (State) argued that ₹2,000 per marla was fair and based on proper evidence, as the land was primarily agricultural with limited urban potential. The Supreme Court analyzed both sides’ arguments, focusing on whether the High Court had erred in determining the fair market value. Issues: Was the compensation of ₹2,000 per marla just and fair in light of the prevailing market rate? Were the appellants entitled to further enhancement of compensation? Were statutory benefits under Sections 23(1A), 23(2), and 28 properly granted? Did the High Court correctly assess the land’s potential and sale comparisons? Current Status (Judgment): The Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s decision and rejected the appeal. The Court held that: The compensation fixed at ₹2,000 per marla was reasonable and evidence-based. The land was primarily agricultural with limited developmental prospects at the time of acquisition. Statutory benefits under the Land Acquisition Act were correctly applied. No further enhancement was warranted as the High Court’s valuation aligned with legal precedents and market evidence. Conclusion: The Supreme Court reaffirmed the High Court’s findings, ruling that the compensation of ₹2,000 per marla was fair, equitable, and in accordance with law. The Court highlighted the importance of balancing the rights of landowners with public interest while ensuring just compensation under the Land Acquisition Act. The appeal was dismissed, confirming the High Court’s judgment in full. Leave a Reply Cancel Reply Logged in as Sada Law. Edit your profile. Log out? Required fields are marked * Message* Case Laws Mala Etc. Etc. vs. State of Punjab & Others – Enhancement of Compensation under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 Sada Law • October 17, 2025 • Case law • No Comments The Supreme Court Upholds Limited Judicial Review under the Arbitration Act of 1940 and Restores the Arbitral Award in a Contractor Dispute Sada Law • October 17, 2025 • Case law • No Comments Criminal Appeal Challenging a Conviction for Murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code Sada Law • October 17, 2025 • Case law • No Comments 1 2 3 … 5 Next »

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The Supreme Court Upholds Limited Judicial Review under the Arbitration Act of 1940 and Restores the Arbitral Award in a Contractor Dispute

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Trending Today The Supreme Court Upholds Limited Judicial Review under the Arbitration Act of 1940 and Restores the Arbitral Award in a Contractor Dispute Criminal Appeal Challenging a Conviction for Murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code M. SIVADASAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS v. A. SOUDAMINI (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS. (2023) Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana & Others Niranjan Das @ Niru Das @ Mahanto vs The State of West Bengal Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) vs Superintendent of Central Excise and Others Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking (August 17, 2023) Assistant Wild Life Warden & Anr. v. K. K. Moideen & Anr. (August 09, 2023) M/S Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India & Ors. KAMAL VERSUS STATE (NCT OF DELHI) The Supreme Court Upholds Limited Judicial Review under the Arbitration Act of 1940 and Restores the Arbitral Award in a Contractor Dispute PRABHAT KUMAR BILTORIA 17 October, 2025 Introduction The case M/s S.D. Shinde (Through Partner) v. Government of Maharashtra, decided by the Supreme Court of India on August 22, 2023, concerned a contractual dispute between a road construction contractor and the Maharashtra Irrigation Department. The contractor had been awarded compensation by an arbitrator under the Arbitration Act, 1940, which was later set aside by the Bombay High Court and the trial court on grounds of limitation, contractual bars, and legal misconduct. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether such judicial interference was justified under the limited review powers of the 1940 Arbitration Act. Background The dispute arose from a government contract for earthwork and canal lining on the Kukadi Left Bank Canal between kilometres 91 and 110, valued at ₹4.01 crores and awarded in 1983. The contractor faced delays due to administrative and environmental factors beyond his control, leading to repeated extensions. When the contractor claimed compensation for additional work and idle resources, the Civil Judge, Ahmednagar, appointed an arbitrator in 1997.The arbitrator awarded the contractor ₹1.5 crores plus interest at 12% per annum from December 1988 to the date of the award.The State challenged this award under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, arguing that the claims were time-barred, beyond the scope of reference, and void due to the non-joinder of all legal heirs of the deceased contractor. Key Developments The trial court and the High Court both set aside the arbitral award. The contractor appealed to the Supreme Court, contesting that the High Court had overstepped the limited review powers available under the Arbitration Act of 1940. The Supreme Court reviewed whether the lower courts had erred in interfering with factual and interpretive findings of the arbitrator. Issues Whether the arbitral award was vitiated by legal misconduct under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Whether the claims were time-barred or barred by specific contractual clauses (Clause 55A and Clause 58). Whether the arbitrator exceeded the scope of reference by deciding matters outside the contract. Whether the award was invalid due to non-joinder of all legal representatives of the deceased contractor. Current Status (Judgment) The Supreme Court, comprising Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Justice Dipankar Datta, allowed the appeal and restored the arbitral award. The Court held that: Limitation was not applicable, as the arbitration was sought within the permissible period from the emergence of disputes. Clause 55A’s bar was inapplicable since the State itself had delayed resolution of claims. The arbitrator did not exceed his authority; all awarded claims arose from the referred disputes and were supported by evidence. The non-joinder issue was cured when the trial court impleaded all legal heirs of the deceased contractor. The 12% interest was reasonable and consistent with economic conditions of the time. Judicial review under the 1940 Act was strictly limited to apparent errors of law; the High Court and trial court had impermissibly reappraised evidence. Accordingly, the Court ordered that the contractor be paid in full within eight weeks and granted full costs to the appellant. Conclusion The Supreme Court reaffirmed that courts must maintain a pro-arbitration approach and restrict interference to cases involving clear legal errors visible on the face of the award. The ruling emphasized the sanctity of arbitral autonomy and the narrow scope of judicial review under the Arbitration Act of 1940. By restoring the contractor’s award, the Court reinforced the principle that arbitration is intended to be a final, binding, and efficient method of dispute resolution, not subject to re-litigation on merits. Leave a Reply Cancel Reply Logged in as Sada Law. Edit your profile. Log out? Required fields are marked * Message* Case Laws The Supreme Court Upholds Limited Judicial Review under the Arbitration Act of 1940 and Restores the Arbitral Award in a Contractor Dispute Sada Law • October 17, 2025 • Case law • No Comments Criminal Appeal Challenging a Conviction for Murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code Sada Law • October 17, 2025 • Case law • No Comments M. SIVADASAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS v. A. SOUDAMINI (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS. (2023) Sada Law • October 17, 2025 • Case law • No Comments 1 2 3 … 5 Next »

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Criminal Appeal Challenging a Conviction for Murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code

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Trending Today Criminal Appeal Challenging a Conviction for Murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code M. SIVADASAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS v. A. SOUDAMINI (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS. (2023) Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana & Others Niranjan Das @ Niru Das @ Mahanto vs The State of West Bengal Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) vs Superintendent of Central Excise and Others Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking (August 17, 2023) Assistant Wild Life Warden & Anr. v. K. K. Moideen & Anr. (August 09, 2023) M/S Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India & Ors. KAMAL VERSUS STATE (NCT OF DELHI) MOHAMMAD WAJID VS STATE OF U.P. (2023) Criminal Appeal Challenging a Conviction for Murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code Reha Bhargav 17 October, 2025 Introduction The case Ram Manohar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, decided by the Supreme Court of India on August 24, 2023, concerns a criminal appeal filed by the appellant against his conviction under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for murder. The appellant claimed that the prosecution’s case was unreliable, based on interested eyewitnesses, and lacked corroborative evidence. The appeal raised critical questions about the credibility of related witnesses, the principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt, and the extent to which the Supreme Court can interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts in criminal trials. Background The appellant, Ram Manohar Singh, was convicted by the trial court for the murder of a man with whom he had longstanding enmity. The incident reportedly occurred in broad daylight and was witnessed by several family members of the deceased. The trial court accepted these testimonies as reliable and convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC, sentencing him to life imprisonment.The Allahabad High Court upheld this conviction, agreeing that the eyewitnesses’ statements were consistent and trustworthy. Dissatisfied, the appellant moved the Supreme Court, alleging bias, false implication due to enmity, and lack of independent corroboration. Key Developments The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC based on direct eyewitness accounts. The Allahabad High Court upheld the conviction, finding no contradictions in the testimonies. The appellant challenged both decisions before the Supreme Court, arguing that the witnesses were related and therefore biased. The State of Uttar Pradesh defended the conviction, stating that related witnesses are not automatically unreliable if their evidence is credible. The Supreme Court analyzed whether the lower courts had properly evaluated the evidence and whether the conviction could stand solely on the basis of such testimony. Issues Whether the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC was justified based on the prosecution’s evidence. Whether the testimonies of related eyewitnesses could be considered reliable and sufficient to sustain a conviction. Whether prior enmity between the accused and the deceased created reasonable doubt about false implication. Whether the Supreme Court should interfere with concurrent factual findings of the trial and High Court. Current Status (Judgment) The Supreme Court, comprising Justice Abhay S. Oka and Justice Sanjiv Khanna, dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction. The Court held that the evidence of related witnesses, if consistent and trustworthy, cannot be rejected merely due to relationship with the deceased. It observed that the prosecution had proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that motive and direct evidence corroborated each other. The Court found no procedural or factual errors in the findings of the lower courts and confirmed the life imprisonment sentence. Conclusion The Supreme Court reaffirmed that credible and consistent eyewitness testimony, even from related witnesses, can validly form the basis for conviction in murder cases. The Court found no reason to doubt the veracity of the prosecution’s evidence and rejected the defense’s claim of false implication. The judgment upholds the principle that justice must be based on evidence quality rather than witness relationships, reinforcing the reliability of trustworthy testimony in criminal law. Leave a Reply Cancel Reply Logged in as Sada Law. Edit your profile. Log out? Required fields are marked * Message* Case Laws Criminal Appeal Challenging a Conviction for Murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code Sada Law • October 17, 2025 • Case law • No Comments M. SIVADASAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS v. A. SOUDAMINI (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS. (2023) Sada Law • October 17, 2025 • Case law • No Comments Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana & Others Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments 1 2 3 … 5 Next »

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M. SIVADASAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS v. A. SOUDAMINI (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS. (2023)

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Trending Today M. SIVADASAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS v. A. SOUDAMINI (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS. (2023) Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana & Others Niranjan Das @ Niru Das @ Mahanto vs The State of West Bengal Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) vs Superintendent of Central Excise and Others Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking (August 17, 2023) Assistant Wild Life Warden & Anr. v. K. K. Moideen & Anr. (August 09, 2023) M/S Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India & Ors. KAMAL VERSUS STATE (NCT OF DELHI) MOHAMMAD WAJID VS STATE OF U.P. (2023) Union of India & Others v. K. Pushpavanam & Others (2023) M. SIVADASAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS v. A. SOUDAMINI (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS. (2023) Nisha Kumari 17 October, 2025 Introduction The case M. Sivadasan (Dead) through LRs. & Ors v. A. Soudamini (Dead) through LRs. & Ors. deals with the interpretation and application of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.The dispute centered on whether a Hindu widow, who neither possessed nor acquired ancestral agricultural land in her own right, could claim absolute ownership under the said provision. The appellants, legal heirs of M. Sivadasan, sought partition and possession of agricultural land on the basis of an alleged pre-existing right of the widow.The Supreme Court examined whether mere entitlement without possession satisfies the requirement of Section 14(1), reaffirming the legal principle that possession is a prerequisite for invoking the protection of this section. Facts of the Case The dispute arose over ancestral agricultural land in Kozhikode, Kerala, measuring approximately 75 cents (33.5 + 42 cents). The appellants (legal heirs of M. Sivadasan) filed a suit in 1988 for partition and mesne profits. The property originally belonged to Sami Vaidyar, who died in 1942. A family arrangement dated March 12, 1938, gave possession of the property to his son Sukumaran, while his widow Choyichi received no share or possession. The property was classified as agricultural land, and since the succession occurred before the 1946 amendment to the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937, the widow had no legal entitlement to the property. Choyichi never had possession of the land during her lifetime. Despite this, her successors (respondents) claimed ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, asserting she had a pre-existing right. The trial court, appellate court, and High Court rejected this claim, holding that lack of possession barred her successors from claiming ownership. The appellants then filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. Issue of the Case Whether a Hindu widow, who was not in possession of ancestral agricultural property and had no legal acquisition or pre-existing right over it, could claim absolute ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956? Judgment The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the consistent findings of all lower courts. It ruled that Section 14(1) applies only when the Hindu woman possesses the property by virtue of inheritance, gift, maintenance, or other recognized legal means. Since Choyichi never possessed or acquired the property, she did not acquire absolute ownership under the Act. The Court emphasized that possession is a mandatory precondition for invoking Section 14(1). Mere theoretical entitlement without possession is insufficient. Finding no exceptional circumstances under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Court refused to interfere with the High Court’s decision. The interim status quo order was vacated, and no costs were awarded. Conclusion The Supreme Court reaffirmed that actual possession is essential for a Hindu woman to claim absolute ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.Since the widow never possessed or legally acquired the property, her heirs could not claim ownership on her behalf.The ruling underscores that mere entitlement without possession does not confer ownership, and thus, the appeal was dismissed — upholding the decisions of all lower courts. Leave a Reply Cancel Reply Logged in as Sada Law. Edit your profile. Log out? Required fields are marked * Message* Case Laws M. SIVADASAN (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS v. A. SOUDAMINI (DEAD) THROUGH LRs. & ORS. (2023) Sada Law • October 17, 2025 • Case law • No Comments Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana & Others Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments Niranjan Das @ Niru Das @ Mahanto vs The State of West Bengal Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments 1 2 3 … 5 Next »

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Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana & Others

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Trending Today Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana & Others Niranjan Das @ Niru Das @ Mahanto vs The State of West Bengal Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) vs Superintendent of Central Excise and Others Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking (August 17, 2023) Assistant Wild Life Warden & Anr. v. K. K. Moideen & Anr. (August 09, 2023) M/S Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India & Ors. KAMAL VERSUS STATE (NCT OF DELHI) MOHAMMAD WAJID VS STATE OF U.P. (2023) Union of India & Others v. K. Pushpavanam & Others (2023) S.S. Cold Storage India Pvt. Ltd v. National Insurance Co. Ltd (2023) Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana & Others Nisha Kumari 16 October, 2025 Introduction The case of Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana & Others, decided by the Supreme Court of India on August 29, 2023, centers around the interpretation and application of Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). This section empowers the court to summon or recall any witness at any stage of a trial if their evidence is essential for a just decision. The appellant, Satbir Singh, had earlier appeared as a prosecution witness in a case concerning alleged data theft. Later, he sought to be recalled for further cross-examination due to the emergence of new facts. The trial court and subsequently the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissed his application, taking a restrictive view of the court’s powers. The Supreme Court’s intervention in this case clarified the broad and purposive scope of Section 311 CrPC and reaffirmed the judiciary’s duty to ensure fair trials and the discovery of truth. Facts of the Case The appellant, Satbir Singh, was a prosecution witness in a criminal trial involving allegations of data theft and related offences by ex-employees of a private company. After giving his testimony, he filed an application under Section 311 CrPC seeking to recall himself for further cross-examination, citing the discovery of new and relevant information crucial for a just resolution. The trial court dismissed his application, holding that such recall was unnecessary and could delay the proceedings. The Punjab and Haryana High Court upheld the trial court’s decision, ruling that the application appeared to be a tactic to prolong the trial. Satbir Singh, aggrieved by these findings, approached the Supreme Court, contending that the denial of recall violated his right to a fair trial and improperly restricted the trial court’s discretion under Section 311 CrPC. Issues of the Case Whether the trial court was justified in refusing the appellant’s request under Section 311 CrPC to recall himself as a witness for further cross-examination? Whether the restrictive interpretation of Section 311 CrPC amounted to a denial of the right to a fair trial, thereby compromising the court’s duty to uncover the truth? Judgment The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the orders of both the trial court and the High Court. Key Observations and Findings: Broad Scope of Section 311 CrPC:The Court reiterated that Section 311 CrPC grants wide discretionary powers to ensure that essential evidence is brought on record. This power should be exercised liberally whenever it serves the interests of justice. Duty to Seek the Truth:The Supreme Court emphasized that the ultimate objective of a criminal trial is the discovery of truth. Therefore, procedural technicalities must not prevent the inclusion of relevant evidence. Fair Trial as a Fundamental Right:The Court noted that the right to a fair trial is an integral part of Article 21 of the Constitution. Denying the recall of a witness, despite the availability of new material evidence, would amount to a violation of due process. Application of Judicial Discretion:The Supreme Court clarified that the trial court must exercise its discretion judiciously, not arbitrarily or mechanically. A rigid or narrow reading of Section 311 CrPC undermines the very purpose of the provision. Accordingly, the Court directed that Satbir Singh be recalled and permitted further cross-examination, ensuring a fair and complete adjudication. Conclusion The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the essence of justice lies in the fair discovery of truth, and that Section 311 CrPC should be applied with a broad and liberal interpretation. The Court criticized the lower courts for adopting a restrictive and procedural approach, thereby compromising the fairness of the trial. By allowing Satbir Singh’s recall, the judgment reinforced that justice must not only be done but must also be seen to be done. This case thus stands as a vital precedent in ensuring that courts prioritize substantive justice over procedural rigidity in criminal proceedings. Leave a Reply Cancel Reply Logged in as Sada Law. Edit your profile. Log out? Required fields are marked * Message* Case Laws Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana & Others Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments Niranjan Das @ Niru Das @ Mahanto vs The State of West Bengal Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) vs Superintendent of Central Excise and Others Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments 1 2 3 … 5 Next »

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Niranjan Das @ Niru Das @ Mahanto vs The State of West Bengal

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Trending Today Niranjan Das @ Niru Das @ Mahanto vs The State of West Bengal Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) vs Superintendent of Central Excise and Others Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking (August 17, 2023) Assistant Wild Life Warden & Anr. v. K. K. Moideen & Anr. (August 09, 2023) M/S Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India & Ors. KAMAL VERSUS STATE (NCT OF DELHI) MOHAMMAD WAJID VS STATE OF U.P. (2023) Union of India & Others v. K. Pushpavanam & Others (2023) S.S. Cold Storage India Pvt. Ltd v. National Insurance Co. Ltd (2023) Dev Gupta v. PEC University of Technology & Others (2023) Niranjan Das @ Niru Das @ Mahanto vs The State of West Bengal PRABHAT KUMAR BILTORIA 16 October, 2025 Introduction This case concerns the right to adequate legal representation in criminal proceedings. The appellant, Niranjan Das, was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Calcutta High Court upheld the conviction; however, the Supreme Court of India found that the appellant did not receive proper legal assistance during the High Court appeal. The Court emphasized that the right to effective legal counsel is integral to the principles of natural justice and fair trial, and remanded the case for reconsideration. Background / Facts of the Case The trial court convicted both the appellant, Niranjan Das, and a co-accused, Subodh Rajbanshi, under Section 302 IPC for murder. The convictions were independent, as the court did not apply Section 34 IPC (common intention). During the High Court appeal, the appellant was unrepresented. On the day of the hearing, the High Court appointed an empanelled advocate to represent him but did not grant sufficient time for case preparation. The appointed counsel incorrectly argued on the basis of common intention (Section 34 IPC), which was irrelevant to the appellant’s conviction. The High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the conviction and sentence. The appellant then filed Special Leave Petitions (Crl.) Nos. 6854–6855 of 2023 before the Supreme Court. Issues of the Case Whether the High Court erred in failing to provide adequate opportunity and time for effective legal representation to the appointed counsel in a life imprisonment appeal? Whether the High Court’s decision, delivered without proper legal assistance to the accused, violated the principles of natural justice and the right to fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution? Judgment The Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction upheld by the Calcutta High Court and remanding the case for fresh consideration. 1. Violation of Right to Fair Representation The Court stressed that the right to legal aid and effective representation is fundamental, especially in serious criminal cases involving life imprisonment. The appointed advocate’s lack of preparation and misdirected arguments (relying on Section 34 IPC) showed that she was not adequately briefed. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s conduct denied the appellant a fair opportunity to defend himself. 2. Setting Aside the Conviction The Supreme Court ruled that the High Court judgment was procedurally unjust and therefore unsustainable. The conviction and sentence of the appellant were set aside, and the matter was remanded to the High Court for a fresh hearing. 3. Bail Granted Considering that the appellant had already served over eight years in prison, the Court directed his release on bail, subject to terms fixed by the trial court. 4. Appointment of Fresh Counsel The appellant agreed to engage new counsel for representation before the High Court. The Supreme Court directed the High Court to list the matter on November 20, 2023, for further hearing. Conclusion The Supreme Court reaffirmed that adequate legal representation is indispensable to a fair trial, forming part of the fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution. It held that the High Court’s failure to provide the appointed counsel sufficient time to prepare constituted a serious breach of natural justice. As a result, the conviction was set aside, and the case was remanded for a fair rehearing. The judgment underscores the judiciary’s duty to ensure due process, especially when an accused faces serious criminal charges without proper legal assistance. Leave a Reply Cancel Reply Logged in as Sada Law. Edit your profile. Log out? Required fields are marked * Message* Case Laws Niranjan Das @ Niru Das @ Mahanto vs The State of West Bengal Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) vs Superintendent of Central Excise and Others Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking (August 17, 2023) Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments 1 2 3 … 5 Next »

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Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) vs Superintendent of Central Excise and Others

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Trending Today Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) vs Superintendent of Central Excise and Others Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking (August 17, 2023) Assistant Wild Life Warden & Anr. v. K. K. Moideen & Anr. (August 09, 2023) M/S Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India & Ors. KAMAL VERSUS STATE (NCT OF DELHI) MOHAMMAD WAJID VS STATE OF U.P. (2023) Union of India & Others v. K. Pushpavanam & Others (2023) S.S. Cold Storage India Pvt. Ltd v. National Insurance Co. Ltd (2023) Dev Gupta v. PEC University of Technology & Others (2023) Asma Shaw vs. The Islamia College of Science & Commerce, Srinagar & Others Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) vs Superintendent of Central Excise and Others PRABHAT KUMAR BILTORIA 16 October, 2025 Introduction This case deals with the priority of claims during the liquidation of a company — specifically, whether the rights of a secured creditor (IDBI Bank) under the Companies Act, 1956, take precedence over customs dues claimed by the government. The Supreme Court was asked to determine if the Customs Department could claim priority over the sale proceeds of goods warehoused by the company to recover customs dues. The case also involved examining the correctness of an earlier Full Bench decision by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. Background / Facts of the Case M/s Sri Vishnupriya Industries Ltd. took a loan from IDBI Bank and hypothecated imported machinery and mortgaged immovable assets as security. The machinery, imported from Italy, remained in bonded warehouses between 1998–1999 due to non-payment of customs duties. Customs authorities issued notices demanding over ₹13.75 crore in duties and initiated the sale of goods under Sections 72(2) and 142 of the Customs Act. In 2003, the company went into liquidation and a winding-up order was passed in December 2003. The Official Liquidator sought to take possession of the goods, but the Andhra Pradesh High Court Full Bench ruled that customs authorities had the first claim. IDBI appealed to the Supreme Court. Issues of the Case Do customs authorities have the first charge over warehoused goods for recovery of customs dues under the Customs Act? Does a secured creditor (IDBI) have priority payment rights under Section 529A of the Companies Act during liquidation? Can government dues override secured creditors’ rights in liquidation? Was the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s reliance on earlier precedents like Dytron India Ltd. correct in law? Judgment The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s ruling. Key Observations: 1. Priority under Section 529A of the Companies Act Section 529A has an overriding effect on all other laws. It grants secured creditors and workers priority in payment during liquidation proceedings. 2. Customs Duties Not Preferential Customs dues in this case were not payable within one year before winding-up, hence not “preferential debts” under Section 530. Therefore, customs dues did not override the secured creditor’s rights. 3. Customs Act Does Not Create a First Charge Sections 72 and 142 of the Customs Act do not establish a first charge over property. No express statutory provision gives customs authorities precedence over secured creditors. 4. Section 142A (2011 Amendment) Introduced a statutory first charge but explicitly preserved secured creditors’ rights under Section 529A. Not applicable retrospectively to disputes prior to 2011. 5. Error in Dytron India Ltd. Judgment The Andhra Pradesh High Court’s reliance on Dytron India Ltd. was misplaced as it contradicted Supreme Court precedents and statutory interpretation. Conclusion The Supreme Court reaffirmed that in the liquidation of a company, secured creditors’ rights and workers’ dues take precedence under Section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956. Government dues, including customs duties, cannot supersede these rights. The decision underscores the non-obstante clause of Section 529A and the principle that recovery powers under special statutes like the Customs Act must yield to the priority framework established by the Companies Act. Consequently, IDBI Bank was entitled to the sale proceeds of the goods ahead of the Customs Department. Leave a Reply Cancel Reply Logged in as Sada Law. Edit your profile. Log out? Required fields are marked * Message* Case Laws Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) vs Superintendent of Central Excise and Others Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking (August 17, 2023) Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments Assistant Wild Life Warden & Anr. v. K. K. Moideen & Anr. (August 09, 2023) Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments 1 2 3 … 5 Next »

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Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking (August 17, 2023)

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Trending Today Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking (August 17, 2023) Assistant Wild Life Warden & Anr. v. K. K. Moideen & Anr. (August 09, 2023) M/S Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India & Ors. KAMAL VERSUS STATE (NCT OF DELHI) MOHAMMAD WAJID VS STATE OF U.P. (2023) Union of India & Others v. K. Pushpavanam & Others (2023) S.S. Cold Storage India Pvt. Ltd v. National Insurance Co. Ltd (2023) Dev Gupta v. PEC University of Technology & Others (2023) Asma Shaw vs. The Islamia College of Science & Commerce, Srinagar & Others Hind Offshore Pvt. Ltd. v. IFFCO–Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. (2023) Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking (August 17, 2023) PRABHAT KUMAR BILTORIA 16 October, 2025 Introduction: This case involves an arbitration dispute between Konkan Railway Corporation Limited (KRCL) and Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking concerning reimbursement claims for tax adjustments incurred during the construction of the world’s tallest railway bridge in Jammu & Kashmir. The core issue revolved around whether the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, had exceeded its authority by reinterpreting contractual clauses and overturning a reasonable arbitral award. The Supreme Court’s ruling reaffirmed the narrow scope of judicial review in arbitration matters and reinforced the principle of arbitral autonomy. Background: KRCL awarded a contract to Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking for the construction of a section of the Udhampur–Srinagar–Baramulla railway line, including the Chenab Bridge. The contract was signed on November 24, 2004. Initially, a 2003 notification exempted earth-moving machinery from entry tax, but this exemption was withdrawn in 2008. The contractor (respondent) claimed: ₹1.32 crore as Increased Entry Tax (Dispute III), and ₹5.23 lakh for Increase of Toll Tax (Dispute IV). The Arbitral Tribunal dismissed both claims, finding that tax risks were contractually transferred to the contractor. The Single Judge of the Bombay High Court upheld the arbitral award under Section 34. However, the Division Bench reversed that decision under Section 37, granting the contractor’s claims by adopting its own interpretation of tax clauses. KRCL appealed to the Supreme Court of India, asserting that the High Court had acted beyond its jurisdiction. Issues: Whether the Division Bench exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 37 by reinterpreting contractual provisions. Whether the Arbitral Tribunal’s interpretation of tax-related clauses was reasonable and within its mandate. Whether the arbitral award was perverse, patently illegal, or against public policy to justify judicial interference. Judgment: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by KRCL and reinstated the arbitral award. Key Findings: 1. Limited Scope under Sections 34 & 37: The Court reiterated that judicial review under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is not appellate in nature. Courts cannot substitute their interpretation merely because a different view is possible. Intervention is warranted only in cases of illegality, irrationality, or perversity in the arbitral award. 2. Arbitral Tribunal’s Interpretation Upheld: The Tribunal reasonably concluded that taxes such as entry tax and toll tax, even if increased after the tender, were included within the contract’s quoted rates. The relevant contractual provisions (Clause 5.1.2) excluded such reimbursement claims, while general price variation clauses (7.1.1 and 7.1.2) did not cover them. Therefore, the arbitral interpretation was held to be logical and legally sound, not perverse. 3. High Court’s Error: The Division Bench overstepped its jurisdiction by substituting its own interpretation under Section 37. Its reliance on Radha Sundar Dutta (1959) for harmonious construction was misplaced in the arbitration context. The Court emphasized that re-evaluation of contract terms is not permissible during arbitral review. 4. Award Not Against Public Policy: The Supreme Court held that a reasonable and plausible interpretation by an arbitrator, even if not the “best,” cannot be invalidated as contrary to public policy. Conclusion: The Supreme Court found that the Division Bench had erred in interfering with a well-reasoned arbitral award. The ruling reinstated the original award that denied the contractor’s tax reimbursement claims. The Court reaffirmed the fundamental principle that arbitral tribunals are the final authority on contract interpretation and factual findings, and that judicial interference is warranted only when awards are patently illegal or perverse. This judgment strengthens the autonomy of arbitration in India and limits judicial intervention to protect the efficiency and finality of arbitral processes. Leave a Reply Cancel Reply Logged in as Sada Law. Edit your profile. Log out? Required fields are marked * Message* Case Laws Konkan Railway Corporation Limited v. Chenab Bridge Project Undertaking (August 17, 2023) Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments Assistant Wild Life Warden & Anr. v. K. K. Moideen & Anr. (August 09, 2023) Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments M/S Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India & Ors. 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Assistant Wild Life Warden & Anr. v. K. K. Moideen & Anr. (August 09, 2023)

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Trending Today Assistant Wild Life Warden & Anr. v. K. K. Moideen & Anr. (August 09, 2023) M/S Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India & Ors. KAMAL VERSUS STATE (NCT OF DELHI) MOHAMMAD WAJID VS STATE OF U.P. (2023) Union of India & Others v. K. Pushpavanam & Others (2023) S.S. Cold Storage India Pvt. Ltd v. National Insurance Co. Ltd (2023) Dev Gupta v. PEC University of Technology & Others (2023) Asma Shaw vs. The Islamia College of Science & Commerce, Srinagar & Others Hind Offshore Pvt. Ltd. v. IFFCO–Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. (2023) State of Karnataka Lokayukta Police v. S. Subbegowda (2023) Assistant Wild Life Warden & Anr. v. K. K. Moideen & Anr. (August 09, 2023) Reha Bhargav 16 October, 2025 Introduction: This case involves the confiscation and subsequent sale of a lorry and rosewood logs seized under the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, for alleged illegal transportation of forest produce. The dispute arose when the Kerala High Court ordered the return of the confiscated property without being informed that the State had already sold the items. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of suppression of material facts by the authorities and the legality of restitution after disposal of confiscated property during pending litigation. Background: On August 8, 2004, forest officials intercepted a lorry carrying rosewood logs concealed under bananas and rice husk, allegedly violating the Kerala Forest Act. The Assistant Wildlife Warden seized the goods and initiated confiscation proceedings under Section 61A of the Act. The District Judge upheld the confiscation, but the Kerala High Court reversed it, ordering the return of the property to the owner, K.K. Moideen. However, it was later discovered that the State had already auctioned and sold the rosewood in April 2008 and the lorry in June 2009 while the case was still pending — a fact not disclosed to the High Court. Key Developments: 2004: Lorry and rosewood logs seized at Tholpetty check-post. District Court: Upheld confiscation under Section 61A, Kerala Forest Act. High Court: Reversed the confiscation and directed the return of goods to Moideen. Non-disclosure: The State failed to inform the court that both items had already been auctioned. Supreme Court: Took note of this suppression and directed a fresh evaluation by the High Court regarding compensation or restitution. Issues: Whether the High Court’s order to return the confiscated property was valid when the State had already sold the goods. Whether the State authorities suppressed material facts by failing to inform the High Court of the sale. What form of restitution or compensation is appropriate when confiscated goods have been disposed of during litigation. Whether the confiscation and sale were legally valid under the Kerala Forest Act, 1961, and whether procedural safeguards were followed. Current Status / Judgment: The Supreme Court partially allowed the appeal. It found that the State’s non-disclosure of the sale was a serious lapse affecting the fairness of the High Court’s order. Since the goods could not be returned, the Supreme Court remitted the matter back to the High Court to determine suitable monetary compensation or restitution, including interest on the sale proceeds. The confiscation’s legality was left open for limited reconsideration based on the facts. Conclusion: The Supreme Court underscored the duty of candor and transparency in litigation, holding that failure to disclose material facts—especially the sale of confiscated property—undermines judicial fairness. While not overturning the confiscation itself, the Court emphasized the need for equitable restitution, directing the High Court to decide on appropriate compensation or value reimbursement. This judgment highlights judicial insistence on accountability from State authorities and the importance of procedural integrity in forest and confiscation cases. Leave a Reply Cancel Reply Logged in as Sada Law. Edit your profile. Log out? Required fields are marked * Message* Case Laws Assistant Wild Life Warden & Anr. v. K. K. Moideen & Anr. (August 09, 2023) Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments M/S Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India & Ors. Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments KAMAL VERSUS STATE (NCT OF DELHI) Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments 1 2 3 … 5 Next »

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M/S Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India & Ors.

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Trending Today M/S Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India & Ors. KAMAL VERSUS STATE (NCT OF DELHI) MOHAMMAD WAJID VS STATE OF U.P. (2023) Union of India & Others v. K. Pushpavanam & Others (2023) S.S. Cold Storage India Pvt. Ltd v. National Insurance Co. Ltd (2023) Dev Gupta v. PEC University of Technology & Others (2023) Asma Shaw vs. The Islamia College of Science & Commerce, Srinagar & Others Hind Offshore Pvt. Ltd. v. IFFCO–Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. (2023) State of Karnataka Lokayukta Police v. S. Subbegowda (2023) M/s. Isnar Aqua Farms v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (2023) M/S Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India & Ors. Reha Bhargav 16 October, 2025 Introduction This case arose from a contractual dispute between M/s Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company (Petitioner) and the Union of India (Respondent). The dispute was referred to arbitration following disagreements regarding payment and execution of contractual obligations. The arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of Larsen, granting both the principal claim and interest at 18% per annum, compounded annually, in accordance with Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Dissatisfied with the rate of interest, the Union of India approached the Allahabad High Court, which modified the award by reducing the interest from 18% compound to 9% simple interest. Larsen appealed this modification before the Supreme Court of India, raising an important question about the extent of judicial interference with arbitral awards under the Arbitration Act, 1996 — specifically, whether courts can modify an arbitral award or only set it aside under limited statutory grounds. Facts of the Case M/s Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company entered into a government contract for execution of air conditioning and refrigeration works. Disputes arose during execution concerning payments and work completion, which were referred to arbitration per the contract terms. The arbitral tribunal awarded Larsen both the principal sum and interest at 18% per annum compounded annually, from the date the cause of action arose until full payment. The Union of India challenged the award before the Allahabad High Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The High Court upheld the award on merits but reduced the interest from 18% compound to 9% simple interest, terming the higher rate as excessive. Aggrieved by this partial modification, Larsen appealed to the Supreme Court, asserting that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to alter any part of the arbitral award. Issues of the Case Whether a court, while exercising powers under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, has the jurisdiction to modify or alter an arbitral award? Whether the reduction of interest from 18% compounded to 9% simple interest amounted to unlawful modification of the award? Whether the award of 18% interest by the arbitral tribunal was valid and enforceable under Section 31(7)(b) of the Act? What is the scope of judicial interference under the 1996 Act — can courts alter an award’s terms or are they limited to setting aside the award on specific statutory grounds? Petitioner’s Arguments Counsel for Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company argued that: The arbitral tribunal lawfully awarded 18% interest under Section 31(7)(b), which allows post-award interest unless parties agree otherwise. The High Court’s jurisdiction under Section 34 is strictly limited to setting aside awards on specific grounds such as patent illegality, fraud, or violation of natural justice — not modifying them. By reducing the rate of interest, the High Court effectively rewrote the arbitral award, which is prohibited under the 1996 Act. The Arbitration Act embodies a pro-arbitration policy emphasizing finality and minimal judicial interference. Hence, the High Court’s action was ultra vires and undermined the autonomy and credibility of the arbitral process. Respondent’s Arguments The Union of India contended that: The 18% compound interest awarded by the tribunal was excessive and unreasonable, particularly in contracts involving public funds. Courts possess the inherent power to correct manifestly unjust or disproportionate awards, especially where the financial burden falls on the public exchequer. The High Court’s reduction of the interest rate did not amount to a modification but was a fair correction ensuring equity and public interest. Even if Section 34 imposes limits, the High Court’s constitutional powers under Articles 226 and 227 allowed it to intervene in the interest of justice. Judgment The Supreme Court allowed Larsen’s appeal and set aside the judgment of the Allahabad High Court, restoring the original arbitral award in full. The Court held that: “The power under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not extend to modifying, revising, or altering an arbitral award. The court’s jurisdiction is confined to setting aside the award in whole or in part if it meets one of the statutorily defined grounds.” Key Observations: The arbitral tribunal’s grant of 18% interest was valid under Section 31(7)(b). The High Court exceeded its jurisdiction by reducing the interest rate. Judicial interference in arbitral awards must be minimal and within the four corners of the statute. The decision reinforced India’s pro-arbitration framework and the finality of arbitral awards. Accordingly, the Supreme Court restored the original award, including the 18% per annum compound interest granted by the arbitral tribunal. Conclusion The Supreme Court’s decision reaffirmed the limited scope of judicial intervention under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It held that courts have no power to modify arbitral awards, including components like interest rates, as doing so would breach the finality and autonomy of arbitration. By reinstating the original award, the Court emphasized that the judiciary must act as a guardian of the arbitral process, not as a reviewing authority rewriting its terms. This ruling strengthens India’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence, ensuring that arbitral awards — once made — remain final, binding, and enforceable, except in cases of clear statutory violations. Leave a Reply Cancel Reply Logged in as Sada Law. Edit your profile. Log out? Required fields are marked * Message* Case Laws M/S Larsen Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Company v. Union of India & Ors. Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments KAMAL VERSUS STATE (NCT OF DELHI) Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments MOHAMMAD WAJID VS STATE OF U.P. (2023) Sada Law • October 16, 2025 • Case law • No Comments 1 2 3 … 5 Next »

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