The Beginning

In the first hearing, insurgents abducted and killed Dr. Mushir-ul-Haq, the interim chancellor of Kashmir University, along with Abdul Gani Zargar, his personal secretary. The case was then turned over to the CBI for investigation after the first FIR was filed in 1990. In order to request the liberation of their associates, the militants, under the leadership of Hilal Beg, had abducted the victims. Following the victims’ deaths, the CBI charged a number of defendants with murder under a number of different laws, including Section 302 of the RPC and the TADA Act.

The subsequent appeal was based on the claimed abduction and murder by the accused of H.L. Khera, the managing director of HMT Watch Factory in Srinagar at the time. To spread panic in the public and force the government to free their accomplices, they were charged with engaging in an illegal alliance. In 2009, the accused were found not guilty despite the allegations when the Special Court dismissed some important evidence and found that the state’s attorney had not proven the accuser’s innocence beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Section 19 of the TADA Act, the State filed a criminal appeal against the conviction, which the Supreme Court accepted in 2009.

Evaluation and Choice

Prior to discussing whether the confessional remarks were admissible or not, the Court examined the pertinent sections of the TADA Act and the TADA Rules pertaining to confessional statement recording. The Court underlined that the TADA Act was a unique piece of law that was passed in order to provide particular measures for dealing with a nuisance and terrorist actions, as well as for matters related to or ancillary to them.

Reviewing Section 15 of the TADA Act and Rule 15 of the TADA Rules, the jury observed that the main idea of Section 15 is that a voluntary admission of guilt made by an individual in front of a police officer with a rank higher than Superintendent of Police (or “SP”) will be allowed in the individual’s trial for a TADA Act offense. Additionally, Rule 15 addresses the administrative components of documenting confessions given to police officers in accordance with Section 15.

Therefore, because TADA was a Special Act, it included an additional clause in Section 15 that allowed confessions recorded by police officers with a rank of at least SP to be accepted as testimony in the trial of the admitting statement maker or the co-accused, abettor, or conspirator if they were brought forward in the same case as the statement maker. The Court emphasized that confessions given to a police officer are typically not admissible as evidence under criminal jurisprudence that has been evolved over a century. A statement of guilt given to a police officer by someone who is accused of a crime is not admissible against him, according to Section 25 of the Evidence Act.

Only a magistrate in charge has the authority to record confessions, and Section 164 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (the “CrPC”) establishes stringent rules for doing so. The Court further stated that the well-established idea that a confession constitutes a confession of guilt serves as the foundation for these protections. Normally, no one would voluntarily acknowledge their wrongdoing because they are well aware that it may be used upon them. Furthermore, the accused is essentially and legally guaranteed from being forced to provide a testimonial. The Court further pointed out that these long-standing standards were superseded by Section 15 of the TADA Act, which substantially changed the basic rules of testimony.

The Court witnessed that in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, the TADA Act’s provisions were contested before the Supreme Court. The judiciary’s Constitution upheld the legality of Section 15 of the TADA Act and the Act in its entirety, but it also established guidelines to guarantee that an admission derived during pre-indictment surveillance by a police officer not lower in rank than an SP is free from undue influence. The purpose of these rules was to guarantee that the apology is made strictly in accordance with widely acknowledged aesthetic standards and basic justice.

In the case of SN Dube v. NB Bhoir, (2000) 2 SCC 254, the Court observed that a two-judge panel of this Court dismissed the defense’s argument that an admission of guilt under Section 15 of the TADA Act should be documented in two stages. The court held that the discussion and identification carried out during the initial phase, when the initial component was documented, could not be deemed sufficient to comply with Rule 15(2). Before what he really is private portion starts, the police officer must give the statutory advice and explain the rights, the Court clarified. Only at that time does the officer have to determine whether the confession is voluntary through interrogation.

The court emphasized that there were no statements in the manner of inquiries and replies in the record that would have suggested the recording officer had good grounds to think respondent 1 was confessing willingly. The transcription officer added that on 06-08-1990, while on an excursion to Srinagar as the SP of the CBI in New Delhi, the first respondent was presented to him. The confessional testimony is vitiated since accused 1 was given very little time for introspection because an admission was captured on the same day. The recording officer claimed in his testimony that he had recorded Respondent 1’s confession on 06-08-1990, but the court also observed that the certificate attached to the confessing testimony was dated 16-09-1990. This created a serious disparity.

The confessions of another two alleged were written down in the same way as the confession of alleged 1, the Court observed; the only distinction was that accused 2’s statement was transcribed at the Joint Interrogation Centre (or “JIC”) in Srinagar, while accused 6’s statement was recorded at the JIC in Kot Bhalwal, Jammu. Important information such as the time of documenting, the location from which they were produced, and if the respondents were allowed any time for reflection prior to the confessions being taken down were not included in the documentation that was attached to their personal statements. This crucial neglect, according to the Court, has totally tainted the area for confessions admissions.

The Court noted that the instrument of abuse was not retrieved in the second appeal, just like in the first felony appeal. Furthermore, the eyewitnesses stated that the accused individuals who were presented in court were not the real accused individuals. In the end, the whole prosecution’s case depended on accused 2’s confessional statement, which the recording officer had captured and had previously rejected. The Court concluded that the Special Court’s decision to convict the accused was correct and sound in light of the aforementioned deliberations.